Analysts' forecasts of firms' earnings and the related forecast errors are issues widely discussed over the huge economic literature. Analysts' forecast are considered as a proxy of rational expectation (RE) therefore they are expected to be much more useful than traditional time series forecasts.
variety of reasons, one being the likelihood that earnings are more predictable for some industries than others. It is plausible that earnings forecasts in less-volatile industries are smaller.
Analysts' forecasts of firms' earnings and the related forecast errors are issues widely discussed over the huge economic literature. Analysts' forecast are considered as a proxy of rational expectation (RE) therefore they are expected to be much more useful than traditional time series forecasts.
Timeliness of the forecasts and forecast accuracy is an interesting trade-off for those that issue forecasts. They need to choose between release forecasts with respect to 10 ISSN 2239-8023 DOI 10.14612/CICIRETTI_1_2011 new information or wait in order to produce more accurate forecasts in the future using additional information.
Information about earning per share can be gained starting from different sources such as proxy statements, quarterly and annual reports, conference calls and other management communications.
These information produced by the analysts are used, among the others, by investors in their trading decisions that affect market prices. If capital markets and the analyst forecasting process are efficient therefore market prices and analysts' forecasts fully and immediately reflect the processed information. A forecast produced this way is denoted as follows:
(
Where represents the information available at a horizon prior to the realization, and is the conditional expectation operator. Nevertheless, in the span between the forecast and the realization date new information may arrive in the market producing inefficiencies that lead to forecast errors. The forecast error is therefore the difference between actual earnings and forecast companies' earnings (per share) and it is defined as:
Where is the computed relative forecast error for the company i made t months before the release date by analyst j for year T, is the actual earning per share for company i in year T, is the forecasted earning per share for company i by analyst j made for year T with the forecast being made t months before the release date and is the stock price for company i at the end of the previous year, T-1.
Technically there is a scale problem in measuring analysts' forecasts and forecast forecasts of earnings, far away from the release date, are higher on average than actual earnings. So ruffling speaking whatever earnings an analyst forecasts for a firm, a better prediction is a somewhat lower level of earnings. This predictable difference is called biased forecast.
At first glance, it seems obvious that unbiased forecasts are the best forecasts because a biased forecast is high or low on average. Such a bias suggests that the forecast can be improved by adjusting the forecast by the bias. There are many conditions in which an unbiased forecast is the best one. A common criterion for forecast errors is mean squared error. If a forecaster wants to minimize the expected mean squared error of a forecast, then an unbiased forecast is the best one. The expected squared forecast error applies an increasing penalty to forecasts farther from the average -a forecast twice as far from zero is four times as bad.
The unbiased forecast -the mean -is not necessarily the best forecast in all circumstances. Suppose that someone is trying to forecast the value shown when a fair die is thrown. The mean forecast is the average of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, which is 3.5. If the forecaster's earnings depend on how close the forecast is to the actual value, the best forecast in fact is 3.5. On the other hand, if the forecaster gets paid only when the value shown is the same as the value forecasted, this unbiased forecast guarantees that the forecaster always loses.
The die will never have the value 3.5. If the forecaster is paid when the forecast is the same as the value thrown and values from 1 to 6 are equally likely, any integer forecast from 1 to 6 is equally good and 3.5 never is predicted. While this is a simple example, the point is more general. The value forecasted depends on the forecaster's incentives and on the distribution of the data. An unbiased forecast may not be the "best" forecast. There also are objectives similar to minimizing the 13 ISSN 2239-8023 DOI 10.14612/CICIRETTI_1_2011 expected squared error that lead to forecasts being "biased." If a forecaster wants to minimize the expected absolute deviation of the forecast error, then the median is the best forecast.
The absolute forecast error applies an increasing penalty to forecast errors farther from zero -a forecast error twice as far from zero is twice as bad. The cost of forecast errors increases linearly with the size of the error.
The forecast that minimizes the expected absolute forecast error is the median, not the mean (or more precisely, the arithmetic average). If the mean and the median are the same, this is a distinction that does not matter. On the other hand, if the distribution is not symmetric, as the earnings distribution is not, the median is a better forecast than the mean if a forecast error's cost increases linearly with the forecast error.
The median is the middle forecast, the forecast that divides the forecasts into two On the other side it also suggest that analysts' forecasts close to the earnings announcement decline to less than the actual earnings. The rationale for this reverse bias is a suggestion that earnings greater than recent forecasts are interpreted as a positive earnings surprise and the firm's stock price increases.
Almost all of the existing economic literature on analysts' forecasts examines whether their forecasts are biased finding that analysts overestimate earnings. This overestimation falls as the earnings announcement approaches. Moreover some evidence and analysis suggests that analysts' forecasts change from overestimates to underestimates just before the earnings announcement. Such near-term forecasts are intended to be helpful to a firm's management because the announcement of higher-than-forecasted earnings generates favorable publicity and a higher stock price after the announcement. Asking for forecasts that are neither too high nor low on average seems like a relatively simple request, especially compared with asking that forecasts be accurate. Even so, it is possible that analysts process the information available to them as best as possible, but some or all analysts do not have an incentive to produce forecasts that are correct on average. On average the mean forecast errors decline as the announcement of earnings for the year approaches.
The theme of the analysts' incentive is deeply analyzed in the literature and in particular it is highlighted the fact that analysts do not make forecasts in isolation.
Other analysts are making forecasts as well, and the existence of other forecasts can affect an analyst's forecasts in many ways. Furthermore the analyst's ability matter. This suggests that, even if analysts' forecasts are biased, it is important to consider analysts' incentives before denouncing them as "irrational" or "ignoring information readily available to them". A lot of factors can explain a nonzero predictable forecast error (i.e. an analyst who performs poorly and is at risk of being fired is more likely to make a "bold" forecast that is unlikely to be correct but will save the analyst's job if it is correct).
